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THE BROKEN COMPASS: THE REQUIREMENT
THAT A CASE ARISE "DIRECTLY"
UNDER FEDERAL LAW *
WIIJLTAM COHEN t
.. the courts have formulated the distinction between
controversies that are basic and those that are collateral,
between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely
possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass
by." 1
"This is not logic. It is practical politics." 2
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States' that a case arises under federal law when a federal
question "forms an ingredient of the original cause." ' Ever since,
defining the "case arising under federal law" jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts has been a puzzle to judge ' and scholar 6 alike.
Marshall held that the statute authorizing the Bank to sue and be
sued in federal courts was constitutional since all suits by the Bank of
the United States arose under federal law. No matter what the nature
of the claim sought to be enforced by the Bank, the capacity of the
Bank to sue and be sued was a potential question of federal law in
each case.' The problems which continue to plague definition of
federal question jurisdiction in the federal trial courts were described
* Professor Paul J. Mishkin has been of considerable assistance to me in straight-
ening out my thinking about the problems discussed here. The usual disclaimer-
that he is not responsible for my errors or lapses-is appropriate throughout, but
particularly so where he has failed to convert me or I have failed to persuade him.
' Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1953, LL.B.
1956, University of California, Los Angeles. Member, California Bar.
I Cardozo, J., in Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936).
2 Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99,
103 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
3 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824).
4 Id. at 822.
6 Few subjects . . .are involved in greater perplexity . . . .Many criteria
have been laid down for determining when a suit arises under federal law.
They can be classified but they cannot be harmonized.
Amidon, J., in McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. 998, 1000 (D.N.D. 1913).
6 Neither in theory nor in practice can a self-contradictory dogma decide a
case. To be sure, the judicial process does not cease to function because of
either vagueness or contradiction in the doctrines it proposes to apply. Its
modus operandi is just the more hidden and mysterious.
Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Question, 90 U. PA. L. REv.
639, 671 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Chadbourn & Levin].
7It is not relevant that the question had been authoritatively decided. "The
right to sue, if decided once, is decided forever; but the power of Congress was
(890)
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by Justice Johnson's dissent.' Where suits were brought originally
in federal courts, jurisdiction founded upon the federal nature of the
questions involved was founded "on a mere hypothesis." " Before the
issue was joined and the cause tried, it was not possible to determine
whether questions of federal law would, in fact, be in issue. If the
federal trial court had jurisdiction because questions of federal law
might arise in the litigation, "jurisdiction . . . over almost every
possible case, might be transferred to the Courts of the United
States." 'o
Of course, at the time of the Osborn opinion, federal courts had
not been given jurisdiction generally over cases arising under federal
law. It was not until 1875 that Congress chose to vest such juris-
diction in the federal trial courts in the language of the constitutional
grant." To have interpreted the statutory grant of jurisdiction to
extend the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts to all cases where
issues of federal law might possibly be in issue was impractical. Such
an interpretation would make those courts substantially courts of
general jurisdiction, since large numbers of law suits could be said to
depend potentially on relevant issues of federal law. For this reason,
the Osborn test has been abandoned as the standard for defining the
scope of the general grant of federal question jurisdiction."2  And,
for the same reason, the statutory grant has been conceded to vest in
the federal courts less than the scope of federal question jurisdiction
which Congress might vest.'3
exercised antecedently to the first decision on that right, and if it was constitutional
then, it cannot cease to be so, because the particular question is decided." 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) at 824. There were actual federal questions, of course, in the Osborn
case. In a companion case, however, the Court sustained jurisdiction in a suit by
the bank as bearer of negotiable notes. United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) 904 (1824).
8Id. at 871.
P Id. at 884.
3o Id. at 875.
" Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
1' Over the dissent of Chief Justice Waite, who argued that Congress did not
intend to adopt the broad meaning of the Osborn decision, the Court held that federally
chartered corporations could remove suits against them as "suits arising under the
laws of the United States.' Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
But, on the same day, the Court rejected the substance of Marshall's analysis in
holding that a suit upon a federal judgment did not arise under federal law. Provident
Say. Life Assur. Soc'y v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635 (1885). Congress has since provided
specifically that federal incorporation is not a basis for federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1349 (1964). The elimination of the provision for removal by plaintiffs, Act of
March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, was
held to preclude removal by defendant on the basis of a federal defense. Tennessee
v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
13 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379-80 (1959);
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See Mishkin, The
Federal "Question." in the District Courts, 53 CoLUm. L. REv. 157, 160-63 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Mishkin]. Of course, the broad language of the statute, com-
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Rejecting potential federal question, however, as a test of general
federal question jurisdiction does not supply an appropriate standard
for defining that jurisdiction. The test suggested by Justice Johnson
in his dissent in the Osborn case is likewise inappropriate. Justice
Johnson believed that the jurisdiction must depend upon questions of
federal law actually involved in litigation. Under this test, no case
could be said to arise under federal law until the issues between the
parties had been determined. 4 For Justice Johnson, this proved that
federal question jurisdiction could not be exercised in an original
form-that it could be vested in the federal courts only upon removal
or appeal from the state courtsY Since 1875, the problem has been
to chart a safe course between the Scylla of "potential federal ques-
tion" and the Charybdis of "actual federal question," in order to
define jurisdiction in cases arising under federal law.
Over 90 years of litigation have made some things clear. First,
a case may arise under federal law although no issue of federal law is
in dispute. 6 Thus, for example, there is jurisdiction in a suit to
recover damages for infringement of a patent although only issues of
fact, such as the identity of the infringer or proof of the amount of
damage, are involved.' 7  It is not anomalous that federal courts
should exercise jurisdiction to enforce federal rights in cases where
only issues of fact are put in issue." Congress has not invested the
bined with the broad statement of Senator Carpenter, who was in charge of the bill,
2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874), argue for the interpretation that Congress intended to
give the federal trial courts all the judicial power specified in Article 3 of the Con-
stitution. Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TULANE L. REV. 362,
374-76 (1942).
Professors Chadbourn and Levin have argued that Congress intended to provide
relief from litigation technically within the limits of the Osbori rationale in section 5 of
the Act of 1875, 18 Stat 470, 472, which required dismissal or remand if it appeared
at any time "such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or contro-
versy within the jurisdiction of said circuit court." Chadbourn & Levin 649-50. See
Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522, 524 (1887). The provision was eliminated in
the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code as "unnecessary." Revisers" Note following
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
34 "[U]ntil the plaintiff can control the defendant in his pleadings, I see no prac-
tical mode of determining when the case does occur, otherwise than by permitting
the cause to advance until the case for which the Constitution provides shall actually
arise." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 889.
15i "[T]he peculiar nature of this jurisdiction is such, as to render it impossible
to exercise in a strictly original form . . . ." Ibid.
16 See McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. 998, 1001 (D.N.D. 1913) ; Chad-
bourn & Levin 660-61; Mishkin 170-71; Note, 37 CoLum. L. Rayv. 1402, 1403.
17The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913). Moreover, so
long as the plaintiff's claim is substantial, jurisdiction is not ousted by the plaintiff's
failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 25. So long as the claim is substantial,
jurisdiction exists even if a claimed federal right proves to be non-existent. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Is The confusion of doctrine in this area results, at least in part, from the con-
tinued repetition of meaningless or even misleading phrases. An example is the
repeated statement that the law suit "really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law . .. .
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inferior federal courts with general jurisdiction to hear cases arising
under federal law merely because these courts are presumed to be more
expert than the state courts in the interpretation of questions of federal
law. The inferior federal courts can, in addition, be expected to be
more sympathetic to the enforcement of federal rights claimed by the
plaintiff. Potential antagonism in the state courts to the enforcement
of the plaintiff's federal right may adversely color findings of fact as
well as rulings on issues of law. It is desirable that a federal forum
be available for trial of factual issues upon which the enforcement
of federal rights may be based.'
It is equally clear that a case does not arise under federal law
where the plaintiff asserts a claim founded solely upon state law and
federal issues enter the case by way of defense.2 ' Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. v. Mottley 21 presents a striking illustration of the rule
requiring that the federal question be "well pleaded" in the plaintiff's
complaint. Mr. and Mrs. Mottley had been injured in a railroad
accident in 1871 and given life-time free passes on the railroad in
consideration of release of their damage claims. Congress enacted a
statute forbidding the giving of free rides or free transportation. The
railroad thereafter refused to renew the Mottleys' passes, claiming that
to do so would violate the statute. The Mottleys brought suit in a
federal court seeking specific performance of the railroad's promise.
Their complaint alleged that the railroad refused to comply with its
agreement solely because of the statute, and that the statute properly
construed did not forbid the issuance of passes to them. Further, their
complaint maintained that if the statute were construed to permit the
revocation of such passes it constituted a taking of property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that the case
did not arise under federal law. In a complaint for specific perform-
ance of a contract, it was necessary only to allege the contract and its
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). The statement results from an
uncritical adoption of the standard for defining the scope of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state courts, where it is both possible and sensible to limit
jurisdiction to review of those cases where federal law issues were "really and sub-
stantially" dispositive of the litigation. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 379 (1821) ; Mishkin at 170. With the exception of Robinson v. Anderson, 121
U.S. 522, 524 (1887), the Court has ignored this supposed requirement while paying
it lip service. See, e.g., Justice Cardozo's opinion in Gully v. First Natl Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936). But cf., Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver
Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 643 (1903). For historical
development of the various mutually contradictory verbal devices in this area, see
Chadbourn & Levin 666-71; see also id. at 649-63.
19 Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 Tur- L. Rsv. 263,
287 (1943); Mishkin 170-76.
20 See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894); Metcalf v.
Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888); cf., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667 (1950).
21211 U.S. 149 (1908).
1967]
894 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
breach. The allegations concerning the statute, its construction, and
its claimed unconstitutionality were appropriately matters to be raised
in the defendant's answer and the plaintiff's reply. To found federal
jurisdiction, it was not only necessary to have federal questions appear
in the plaintiff's complaint, but also that federal questions so presented
be properly alleged as a matter of good pleading.2"
The result in the Mottley case is startling, since it is apparent that
only issues of federal law were in dispute.2" Requiring such litigation
to be brought initially in state court is not easily explained.24  The
"well-pleaded" rule has the advantage of providing a rule of thumb
to deny access to federal courts to a large number of cases where
potential federal issues lurk. Moreover, the rule can be defended as
a pragmatic rule of necessity which permits the determination of juris-
diction when the complaint is filed, without awaiting the defendant's
pleading. Like any rule of thumb, however, it operates blindly to
preclude original federal jurisdiction in cases where, as a matter of
sound policy, the parties ought to be permitted to choose a federal
forum.2 6
22 The Court quoted the following language of Mr. Justice Peckham, in Boston
& Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co.,
188 U.S. 632, 639 (1903) :
It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order to prove complainant's
cause of action to go into any matters of defense which the defendants might
possibly set up, and then attempt to reply to such defense, and thus, if possible,
to show that a Federal question might or probably would arise in the course
of the trial of the case. To allege such defense and then make an answer to
it before the defendant has the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own
defense is inconsistent with any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware,
and is improper.
Id. at 153.
23The legal issues which the Mottleys had attempted to present by their antici-
patory pleading were subsequently presented to the United States Supreme Court
on appeal from the later state court decision. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley,
219 U.S. 467 (1911). The state courts granted specific performance, but the Supreme
Court reversed, upholding the railroad's federal defense.
24 It may be, that as long as ultimate Supreme Court review is available, occasional
cases, like the Mottley case, which require litigation of federal defenses in the state
courts, are not as troublesome as they might be. The availability of discretionary
review on certiorari, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1964), is, of course, not a fair substitute
for jurisdiction as of right in the trial court, if it is assumed that it is important to
give parties access to federal courts for trial of federal law issues.
25 It is not a rule of necessity in the sense that alternative solutions are impossible.
Special allegations of federal question jurisdiction in the complaint might have been
permitted as are special allegations of diversity jurisdiction. See Mishkin at 164.
As noted, supra note 13, Professors Chadbourn and Levin have argued that the Act of
1875 was intended to permit the denial of jurisdiction after all the pleadings were
submitted. Whatever the practical arguments for and against permitting the juris-
dictional question to remain in abeyance pending the filing of responsive pleadings,
this solution now seems foreclosed by the repeal of the statute upon which the argu-
ment was based. See note 13 supra. Of course, these pragmatic considerations
cannot explain why a defendant is not permitted to remove a case to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision
of the JAdicial Code, 13 LAw & CoNrTmp. PRoD. 216, 233-34 (1948).
26 Most of the inexplicable results in relegating litigation of federal issues to
state courts stems from the requirement that jurisdiction be determined on the face
[Vol.115:890
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The requirement that matters of federal law be "well-pleaded" in
the complaint could not in and of itself provide a rationale for denying
jurisdiction over all litigation which threatened to flood the federal
courts when Congress generally authorized the assumption of juris-
diction in cases arising under federal law. In his dissent in the
Osborn case, Justice Johnson warned, prophetically, that "there is
not a tract of land in the United States, acquired under laws of the
United States, whatever be the number of mesne transfers that it
may have undergone, over which the jurisdiction of the Courts of the
United States might not be extended .' 27 After 1875, liti-
gation concerning the title to Western lands threatened to engulf
federal courts. Suits in ejectment could be dismissed readily under
the "well-pleaded" rule. Although plaintiff's title may have been re-
cently or remotely derived from a federal source, a complaint in
ejectment need only allege the plaintiff's prior right to possession. As
a matter of common law pleading, the claim that plaintiff's title was
superior to that of the defendant would be raised in reply to the
defendant's answer.2 In suits to quiet title, however, plaintiff could
appropriately plead the source of his title in his complaint. 2 Unless
the federal courts, whose resources were severely strained, were
to be available in all quiet title actions involving Western land, a
doctrinal device had to be developed to remove such cases from federal
jurisdiction.0
There has been much written about federal question jurisdiction.
It is not the function of this article to explore, at length, those doc-
trinal roads which have been so well mapped by others.3 ' I propose
of the complaint without reference to the issues which separate the parties in the
particular lawsuit See Chadbourn & Levin 649-63. Much of the rigidity introduced
by the "well-pleaded" rule could be avoided by rejecting the rationale of Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), which requires that the pleadings
in a declaratory judgment action be judged as if the plaintiff had brought a common
law coercive action. Another, more effective solution, would be to enlarge defend-
ant's opportunity to remove on the basis of a federal defense. See text accompanying
notes 108-09 infra.
2722 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 875.
28 See Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906).
29 See Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912) ; Marshall v. Desert Properties
Co., 103 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563 (1939).
30 A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United
States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those
laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a
dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such
a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is especially
so of a suit involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United States.
If it were not, every suit to establish title to land in the central and western
States would so arise, as all titles in those States are traceable back to those
laws.
Shulthis v. McDougal, supra note 29, at 569-70.
311 BAna oN AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE 120-30 (Wright
ed. 1960); DoBni, FEmEAL PROCEDURE 163-83 (1928); HART AND WECHSLER, THE
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to focus upon that doctrinal requirement last mentioned-beyond the
requirement that a federal ingredient be "well-pleaded" in the com-
plaint-which seeks to limit the scope of the statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction. For convenience, that requirement can be de-
scribed as requiring that a claim arise "directly" under federal law.2
It is my purpose to explore the history of the development of and to
ascertain whether any meaning can be ascribed to this ephemeral rule
of federal question jurisdiction, in order to explain the results reached
by the Court.
The Law That Creates the Cause of Action
The early decisions construing the Act of 1875, which gave juris-
diction to the federal trial courts in cases arising under federal law,
contain conflicting and confused language from which contradictory
theories can be drawn.33  However, one line of decisions is entitled
to separate consideration-that which attempted to define juris-
diction according to whether federal or state law created the plaintiff's
cause of action. The earliest clear example of this rationale is the
case of Feibelnman v. Packard.4  While the rationale of this case has
often been ignored, perhaps because of the unilluminating opinion of
Mr. Justice Matthews, the Court upheld jurisdiction because federal
law had given plaintiff his cause of action, although no questions of
federal law were actually in dispute. Plaintiff had brought suit
against a United States marshal and the sureties on the marshal's bond
to recover damages for alleged unlawful taking of property pursuant
to a federal court warrant. Removal to federal court was upheld on
the ground that "the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action" demon-
strated that the case arose under federal law. The Court distinguished
a suit against the marshal for trespass from this suit to recover dam-
ages on the bond. While the issues to be litigated might be identical,
in the latter case federal statutes expressly required the bond and
provided for suit thereon.
Mr. Justice Holmes stated the theory with more clarity thirty
years later. In The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 5 plaintiff
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 727-809 (1953) ; 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAc-
RICE 0.60[8.-3] (2d ed. 1964); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 48-59 (1963); Berg-
man, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MicH. L. REv. 17 (1947);
Chadbourn & Levin; Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18
TULANE L. REV. 263 (1943) ; Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16
TULANE L. REv. 362 (1942) ; Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction,
49 Mici. L. REv. 73 (1950); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction--A Snare and
a Delusion, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 835 (1959); Mishkin.
32 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936); Mishkin 165, 168.
33 The doctrinal confusion of the early cases has been admirably chronicled else-
where. See Chadbourn & Levin.
34109 U.S. 421 (1883).
35 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
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sought to enjoin the resale of plaintiff's patented devices at less than
the stipulated price. The defense claim was that the patent law did
not permit the manufacturer-patent-holder to control resale prices. The
Court held that the defense contention, even if true, did not oust the
court of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
[G]ood or bad, the cause of action alleged is a cause of
action under the laws of the United States.
Of course the party who brings a suit is master to
decide what law he will rely upon and therefore does deter-
mine whether he will bring a "suit arising under" the patent
or other law of the United States by his declaration or bill. 6
The Fair did not involve the problem of the mixed claim of
federal and state law, but the problem of distinguishing a "substan-
tial" federal claim from one so insubstantial as not to provide a basis
for federal question jurisdiction. Holmes later attempted to regularize
"the law creating the cause of action" as an all-purpose test of federal
question jurisdiction for those cases where the plaintiff's claim com-
bined elements of federal and state law. In his opinion for the Court
in American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co.," he held there
was no jurisdiction in a removed case because plaintiff's cause of
action derived from state law. Yet, in all probability, the case turned
solely on issues of federal law. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had
slandered title to plaintiff's pump by falsely stating it infringed de-
fendant's patent. It should be noted, preliminarily, that the "well-
pleaded" rule will not, alone, explain the decision that the case does
not arise under federal law. Apparently, in cases involving trade libel,
as distinguished from cases involving personal defamation, falsity of
the defendant's statements must be alleged in the complaint as part
of the plaintiff's cause of action." Allegations of the falsity of de-
fendant's statements then raise the issue of the scope and validity of
the defendant's patent rights. In any event, Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion for the Court did not rest on the contention that truth of the
defendant's claim of infringement was an issue to be raised affirma-
tively in the answer. Rather, his reasoning was that if false claims
of patent infringement are actionable, they are actionable because state
law provides a cause of action for trade libel.3 9 Establishing a par-
ticular position of federal law was no more, in other words, than a
"condition" of recovery.
36 Id. at 25.
37241 U.S. 257 (1916).3 s PROSsER, ToRTs 943 (3d ed. 1964).
39 The same reasoning would explain the rule that a suit upon a contract to pay
royalties to the patent-holder does not arise under the patent laws. Albright v. Teas,
106 U.S. 613 (1882).
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A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.
The fact that the justification may involve the validity and
infringement of a patent is no more material to the question
under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an
action of contract. . . . The state is master of the whole
matter, and if it saw fit to do away with actions of this type
altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose that they still
could be maintained under the patent laws of the United
States.4
Holmes' test has, at first blush, strong appeal as a neutral,
analytical tool to solve the puzzle of marking the line of original
federal question jurisdiction in cases involving mixed elements of
state and federal law. It has severe limitations, however, undermining
its ability either to explain past decisions or chart the course for the
future. First is the problem of applying the test. Holmes' reasoning
in American Well Works was that the plaintiff's cause of action arose
under state law because he could not recover unless he could demon-
strate that state law gave him a right of action for trade libel-"the
state is master of the whole matter." The difficulty is that this
brand of "but-for" reasoning could easily have led to the opposite
conclusion if approached from the other end. In other words, plaintiff
could not recover unless he could demonstrate the invalidity or limited
scope of the defendant's patent-issues as to which federal law "is
master of the whole matter." Unless Holmes meant to take the un-
tenable position that no case involving mixed elements of state and
federal law arises under federal law, "but-for" standards do not deter-
mine whether the cause of action is federal or state. What appears to
be a self-applying analytical standard breaks down because it fails to
supply an analytical definition which will determine whether plaintiff's
claim is a federal cause of action incorporating state law, or a state
cause of action incorporating federal law.4 '
The leading case of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.42 is
illustrative of the difficulty. A corporate shareholder sued to enjoin
the corporation from investing in farm loan bonds, issued by Federal
Land Banks or Joint-Stock Land Banks under authority of the Federal
Farm Loan Act of 1916, on the ground that the Act was uncon-
stitutional. The Court held that the case arose under federal law
because the invalidity of the law was properly alleged in the complaint,
and plaintiff's success depended upon establishing the construction of
federal law propounded by the plaintiff. The Court had turned around
40 241 U.S. at 260.
41See HART & WECESLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TiE FEDERAL SysTEm 766
(1953).
42255 U.S. 180 (1921).
[Vol.l15:890
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the "but-for" test of American Well Works to focus on the essen-
tiality of the allegations of federal law. Holmes dissented, arguing
that the suit was to establish breach of the corporate directors' state-
imposed duty to properly invest corporate funds.
If the Missouri law authorizes or forbids the investment
according to the determination of this Court upon a point
under the Constitution or acts of Congress, still that point
is material only because the Missouri law saw fit to make
it so. The whole foundation of the duty is Missouri law,
which at its sole will incorporated the other law as it might
incorporate a document. The other law or document de-
pends for its relevance and effect not on its own force but
upon the law that took it up, so I repeat once more the
cause of action arises wholly from the law of the State.3
Despite the fact that there was no serious claim that Missouri in fact
permitted investment of corporate funds pursuant to unconstitutional
federal laws, Holmes insisted that the cause of action arose under
state law because plaintiff's standing to challenge the law could have
been nullified by a hypothetically different state law. Again, unless
Holmes is seriously arguing that no mixed state and federal claim
arises under federal law, his test does not explain his contention that
the plaintiff's cause of action in Smith is state rather than federal.
If Holmes is right that the plaintiff's cause of action should be
properly characterized as state-created, it must be for reasons he has
failed to illuminate. Of course, the majority's reverse "but-for"
reasoning leads to the conclusion that all mixed federal-state claims
arise under federal law, and as a working standard of federal question
jurisdiction has the vice of over-inclusiveness.
It may be rejoined that the distinction between cases where state
law creates the cause of action and those where the law creating the
cause of action is federal has enough substance that clear cases can
be put on the extremes. Certainly, no distinction is valueless simply
because borderline cases are hard to decide. In other words, the
argument would run that clear cases can be put as to which everyone
will agree; that federal law merely gives permission for the assertion
of a state-created cause of action; or that a particular proposition of
federal law is no more than a "condition" to assertion of a successful
state cause of action. Such, for example, is the case of Skelly Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,44 where contracts by gas suppliers provided
that the contracts could be terminated if the purchaser failed to procure
a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal
43 Id. at 214.
44 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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Power Commission before a certain date. The Commission issued a
certificate, contingent upon certain conditions. A suit for declaratory
judgment was brought for a determination whether the conditional
certificate was a certificate within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act
and the contracts. Here, it may be argued, the cause of action of
any party to the contract was a state-law-based action on the con-
tracts. Federal law was relevant only because the parties chose an
event resting on federal law to measure the power of termination.'
So long as cases can be put where good lawyers will all agree that
the cause of action is federal or state, the distinction then has enough
meaning that it may be used as a tool for measuring federal
jurisdiction."
The argument just summarized bears a family resemblance to the
argument put a legal generation ago by some procedure scholars who
urged that the "cause of action" concept had enough meaning to be
a useful analytical tool for solving such procedural problems as mark-
ing the permissible scope of joinder of parties and claims within a
single lawsuit." While the corpse still twitches 4 (perhaps because
of some galvanic reflex action endemic to the law) that argument was
put to rest by the convincing counter-demonstration that causes of
action were defined by pragmatic factors generated by the particular
controversy in the particular case.49 I suspect, whenever a concept
cannot be defined except by circular reference to itself, that "easy
cases" are more often explained by unstated pragmatic factors than
by reference to any inherent reality in the concept itself. Are cases
where "all lawyers will agree" that the plaintiff's cause of action is
state-created sometimes the result of the fact that those same lawyers
will agree, for unstated and unarticulated reasons, that the case does
not "belong" in federal court? To the extent that this is true, the
problem becomes that of discovering and articulating the relevant
factors.
A second difficulty with the mystic belief that the cause of action
concept had some inherent self-defining meaning stemmed from the
fact that the concept had many uses. The question whether causes of
action were single or multiple had such multifarious consequences as
determining proper joinder at the outset of the lawsuit and determin-
45 Mishkin 183.
46 Professor Mishkin puts the analogous case where parties wager as to the next
incumbent of a federal office. Id. at 184. For further discussion of this case see
text accompanying: notes 77-81 infra.
47 See articles cited in CLARK, CODE PLEAD NG 132 n.149, 142 nn.177-79 (2d ed.
1947).
48 See Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and Independent Claim
or Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. Rrv. 1, 16-17 (1961).
49 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 137 (2d ed. 1947).
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ing the res judicata impact of the judgment obtained. Everyone might
agree that there was a single cause of action because, unconsciously,
this seemed to promote the proper result with reference to joinder
questions. Uncritically applying this "hunch" definition of cause of
action to a res judicata question might end in a result that flew in the
teeth of the factors which ought to have controlled the decision. Is it
possible that, in some cases where "all lawyers will agree" that the
plaintiff's cause of action is state-created, the case, and all those like
it, do "belong" in federal court? This difficulty is the exact converse
of the first, but both may be present to some extent at the same time.
In some cases, the conclusion that the cause of action is state-created
may seem easy because the case does not "belong" in federal court;
in some cases, an easy conclusion that the cause of action is state-
created may coincide by accident with the conclusion that the case
does not "belong" in federal court; in some cases (and these may
be the most difficult), an easy conclusion that the cause of action is
state-created may, without good reason, conflict with the conclusion
that the case does "belong" in federal court.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.i5 is again illustrative.
In that case, the Court held that a corporate shareholder's suit to
enjoin a corporation from participating in a federal program, on
grounds that the federal act setting up the program was uncon-
stitutional, arose under federal law. There is room for legitimate
debate whether the shareholder should be given standing to challenge
an act of Congress in a suit where the dangers of a collusive lawsuit
loom large.5 The question of standing is the same, however, whether
the suit proceeds in the state courts and then to the Supreme Court,
or whether it is allowed to begin in a federal trial court. The question
whether a suit arises under federal law is relevant only to the question
whether litigation may commence in a federal court. Any doubts on
the issue of standing should not be permitted to influence the question
whether the suit may be begun in federal court, or whether it must
find its way to the Supreme Court through state litigation. Passing
the question of standing and focusing solely on the question whether
the case arises under federal law, it is difficult to distinguish the
situation in the Smith case from a suit by the corporation to enjoin
enforcement of a coercive federal law on constitutional grounds. 2 The
60 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
51 See Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 349 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring). For a description of the manner in which the issues were framed in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), see Stern, The Comnwrce Clause and the
National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 667-68 (1946).
52 By similar reasoning, a suit to declare a contract invalid under federal law
should be appropriately within the jurisdiction of a federal trial court. See Mish-
kin 181.
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latter suit would, concededly, arise under federal law. If it is con-
ceded, arguendo, that Holmes correctly concluded that the Smith suit
arose under state law, the constitutional questions in that case could be
adjudicated in a federal court only on appeal from the state courts,
while, in suits to enjoin the enforcement of coercive federal statutes,
a federal trial court forum would be available. It would be difficult
to give realistic reasons for such a distinction.
Another often-cited decision illustrates the other side of the
coin-a situation where the Court's decision relegated to the state
courts a cause of action which appears to have been created explicitly
by an Act of Congress. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter" involved
a thorough-going Congressional scheme for settling conflicting claims
of miners. An application for issuance of a patent for a mining claim
was to be filed in the General Land Office. If an adverse claim were
then filed, the adverse claimant was required, within thirty days after
filing his claim, to begin suit "in a court of competent jurisdiction,"
to determine his right to possession, and prosecute the action to
judgment. The Commissioner of the General Land Office was directed
to issue the patent in accordance with the judgment of the court.
Finally, it was provided that right to possession was to be determined
by "local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts,
so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws
of the United States." The Court held that the suit of an adverse
claimant was not within the general grant of federal question juris-
diction. The Court's reasoning seemed to hark back to that of
Justice Johnson's dissent in the Osborn case--denying jurisdiction
because questions of federal law were not necessarily involved.
Inasmuch . . . as the "adverse suit" to determine the right
of possession may not involve any question as to the con-
struction or effect of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, but may present simply a question of fact as to the time
of discovery of the mineral, the location of the claim on
the ground, or a determination of the meaning and effect of
certain local rules and customs prescribed by the miners of
the district, or the effect of state statutes, it would seem to
follow that it is not one which necessarily arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States.54
The Shoshone case is indistinguishable from the case of the suit on
the Marshal's bond 0 under Holmes' test. In both cases, while most
suits would center around issues of fact or of state law, the cause
53 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
54 Id. at 509.
55 Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883).
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of action was expressly created by Act of Congress. Even if all
lawyers will agree that the plaintiff's cause of action in Shoshone is
federal (state law merely being incorporated by reference), it does
not follow that the Court reached the "wrong" result. The Court was
properly concerned with the volume of litigation which a contrary
decision would have loosed upon federal trial courts overburdened by
the expansion of jurisdiction caused by the Judiciary Act of 1875. The
Court, for pragmatic reasons, had refused to extend the jurisdiction
to a large class of cases which would, in most instances, involve no
clearly defined federal interest and no issue of federal law. The
Court's failure-if one there was-lies in its failure to explain the
result. The explanation would have been no more satisfactory had
the Court tortured the statute to characterize the plaintiff's claim as
one given by state rather than federal law. Inquiry into whether
federal or state law confers the plaintiff's cause of action can be, at
most, only a starting point for analysis.
Arising "Directly" Under Federal Law---The Gully Case
In Gully v. First National Bank " a state tax collector sued a
national bank in a state court to recover state taxes due. The taxes
had been assessed against a predecessor national bank, whose debts
had been contractually assumed by the defendant. The case was
removed to federal court on the ground that the action arose under
federal law since state taxation of national banks was permissible only
because of a federal statute granting such permission. Thus, the
state tax collector had to rely upon the statute in imposing the tax.
Rejecting this argument, Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court
represents the Court's last attempt to deal comprehensively with the
general statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction. Gully is not,
unfortunately, a classic example of the Cardozo opinion-removing
the underbrush of dead and dying contradictory prior decisions and
leaving in its stead a clear path to follow for the future. The case,
itself, could have been decided solely on the basis of the "well-pleaded"
rule, on the ground that the tax collector's suit needed only to allege
the state-law obligation to pay taxes. Federal law was relevant only
because it had renounced a defense which the United States Con-
stitution would otherwise have given the defendant; like the Mottley r7
case, federal law, as a matter of pleading, provided a defense and a
reply to the defense. Cardozo seems to rely squarely upon the "well-
pleaded" rule, citing the Mottley decision, and stating that "a suit
56 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
67211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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does not arise under a law renouncing a defense," any more than it
arose in Mottley under a law creating a defense."
Before reaching that point, however, Justice Cardozo had re-
peated and given new vitality to many of the unfortunate contra-
dictory "tests" of the older cases. Such, for example, were the
statements that "a genuine and present controversy, not merely a
possible or conjectural one must exist," " and "a suit does not .
arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or contro-
versy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon
the determination of which the result depends." 60 These phrases had
been uncritically transferred, in earlier cases, from the standard which
appropriately governs the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
There, given a case that has been tried and reviewed "by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had," "' the court
appropriately limits its appellate jurisdiction to the decision of actual
federal questions. While Cardozo perpetuates earlier confusion by
continuing to recite an impossible actual federal question standard,
he also relies heavily on Holmes' test of the law that creates the
cause of action. The basis of the suit is the state-law obligation to
pay taxes. "That there is a federal law permitting such taxation
does not change the basis of the suit, which is still the statute of the
state, though the federal law is evidence to prove the statute valid." "
Had the opinion ended here, it would have been merely the last in
a string of examples appropriately applying the "well-pleaded" rule
to deny jurisdiction and continuing to recite, in addition, the meaning-
less or confusing "tests" of federal question jurisdiction from past
cases. It is only in the last few paragraphs of the opinion that an
attempt is made to strike new ground.
The most one can say is that a question of federal law
is lurking in the background, just as farther in the back-
ground there lurks a question of constitutional law, the ques-
tion of state power in our federal form of government. A
dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from
plain necessity, is unavailing to extinguish the jurisdiction
of the states.
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is
the attempt to define a "cause of action" without reference
to the context. . . . To define broadly and in the abstract
''a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
58 299 U.S. at 116.
59 Id. at 113.
6o Id. at 114.
6128 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948).
62 299 U.S. at 115.
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States" has hazards of a kindred order. What is needed
is something of that common-sense accommodation of judg-
ment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law
in its treatment of problems of causation. One could carry
the search for causes backward, almost without end.
Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones
aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the search
for underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough,
countless claims of right can be discovered to have their
source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal
statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient
restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the
pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between
controversies that are basic and those that are collateral,
between disputes that are necessary and those that are
merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that
compass by."
Here are important new insights! Assuming a well-pleaded issue
of federal law, the federal question jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts is defined not by conceptual standards or self-applying talismanic
phrases, but by "common-sense accommodation of judgment." There
is room here for weighing countervailing pragmatic considerations in
determining whether classes of cases should be eligible for initial trial
in federal courts. But what are those factors, and how are they to
be judged? Here, Cardozo's opinion lapses into an opaque mysticism
which, thirty years later, is as impenetrable as when the opinion was
written. What is the nature of the distinction between federal law
controversies "that are basic and those that are collateral"? Can
anyone chart a line between "disputes that are necessary and those
that are merely possible"? If we have been given a compass to escape
the maze, it is one with all directions pointing back into the maze.
It is difficult to improve on the comment of Professors Chadbourn and
Levin: "This is prose so beautiful that it seems almost profane to
analyze it. . . . How this magic can be performed still remains a
mystery of the judicial process." '
Pragmatic Standards for a Pragmatic Problem
The scope of the pragmatic problem of defining the limits of
original federal question jurisdiction is easily stated. The bulk of
federal civil litigation in the federal courts presents no jurisdictional
problem. Routine federal question litigation arises under federal
631d. at 117-18.
04 Chadbourn & Levin 670-71.
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statutes which not only create federal causes of action but contain
special grants of jurisdiction as well. 5 It is the unusual, novel,
atypical claim which presents the problem. A novel claim of mixed
federal and state law ought to qualify as "arising under" federal law
only if it exhibits those features which justify the need for federal
trial court jurisdiction of federal question cases. A case that requires
expertise in the construction of the federal law involved in the case,
and a sympathetic forum for the trial of factual issues related to the
existence of a claimed federal right, ought to fall within federal juris-
diction. On the other hand, a federal court should not be compelled
to accept federal question jurisdiction over a class of suits which
typically neither involves actual contested issues of federal law nor
requires the protective jurisdiction of a sympathetic federal trial forum.
Judged by pragmatic considerations, most of the leading cases
deciding whether a case "arises" under a well-pleaded federal law in-
gredient, appear, at least at this distance, properly decided. As already
indicated, the two Supreme Court cases most difficult to square with
"the law that creates the cause of action" standard are easily ex-
plained by pragmatic considerations. In stockholders' derivative suits
presenting substantial federal constitutional objections to federal stat-
utes, taken as a class, the federal constitutional issues are likely to be
among the most significant in the litigation. In cases like Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co.," it is certain that the federal con-
stitutional issues will form the core of the litigation. Those issues
require the same expert and sympathetic federal forum at the trial
level as they would if presented in an injunction suit against a federal
official. On the other hand, there is little reason to fear that the
sustaining of jurisdiction in this class of litigation would add sig-
nificantly to the workload of an overburdened federal judiciary. By
contrast, the practical reasons for refusing jurisdiction in Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter " were overwhelming. The congressional direc-
tive that controversies between rival claimants for mineral rights be de-
cided by "local customs or rules of miners" meant that most of these
lawsuits would turn on a combination of factual issues and interpreta-
tion of local law or custom, not requiring the expertise of a federal
trial forum. There was no significant federal government interest in
the choice between the rival claimants which would require the
protective jurisdiction of a federal trial court. Finally, and most
65 The Senate Committee reporting on the 1958 amendments to the Judicial Code
concluded that the only significant class of cases resting federal question jurisdiction
on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 rather than a special jurisdictional statute were Jones Act cases
and suits challenging the constitutionality of state statutes. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
66225 U.S. 180 (1921).
67 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
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important, accepting jurisdiction in Shoshone would have added sig-
nificantly to the business of overburdened federal trial courts in
the West.
It is not startling that these practical considerations precipitated
the results in Smith and Shoshone. Nor is it unusual that the Court
in the two cases applied contradictory analytical formulas to explain
the results, rather than resting squarely on those factors which, no
doubt, influenced the actual decisions. What is surprising is the
continuing belief that there is, or should be, a single, all-purpose,
neutral analytical concept which marks out federal question juris-
diction. A frank recognition of the pragmatic nature of the decision-
making process would help throw light on the factors which actually
induce decision. It would, moreover, reduce the danger that a judge
would be beguiled by one of the numerous analytical tests into reaching
an indefensible result.
A good example of an analytical formula producing the wrong
result is American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co.,"8 where
Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court rejected federal question juris-
diction in a suit by the alleged infringer of the defendant's patent. It
will be recalled that Holmes reasoned that plaintiff's claim for slander
of title was state-created. Congress had seen the need for a sym-
pathetic and expert federal forum in patent cases as so significant that
it had provided for exclusive jurisdiction by the district court in
cases arising under the patent laws. The holder of a patent, in
other words, was not given the option of vindicating his patent law
claim in a state court. But, with the parties reversed, and the alleged
infringer seeking judicial relief through the mechanism of a suit for
slander of title, the doctrine of American Well Works produces an
anomalous result. Not only can the alleged infringer compel the
patent holder to litigate the validity and coverage of his patent in a
state court, but neither party, in a suit by the alleged infringer, is
allowed the choice of a federal forum. If there are sound pragmatic
reasons which support this result, they are difficult to guess, unless
the Court was concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts in patent cases would unduly interfere with state court juris-
diction over state-law-based tort claims involving issues of federal
patent law. 9 It is significant that the Declaratory Judgment Act has
been construed to create a federal claim by the alleged infringer for a
declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed.70
t8241 U.S. 257 (1916).
69 Compare the rule that suits to enforce contracts concerning patent and copy-
right rights do not arise under federal law. Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882).
70E. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937) ; see Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 802-03 (1949).
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American Well Works remains the leading case for testing original
federal question jurisdiction by the "law which creates the cause of
action." But in the precise area of the decision-suits by alleged patent
infringers-the practical unsoundness of its result has been largely
overturned by interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
It may be objected that recognition of the pragmatic nature of
the decision whether a claim arises directly under federal law will lead
to an ad hoc, unpredictable, case-by-case decision of jurisdictional
questions. It goes without saying that it is undesirable for juris-
dictional rules to be uncertain. Particularly since objections to juris-
diction of the district court cannot be waived,' and since in many
cases the lack of jurisdiction can even be asserted by the party who
invoked federal jurisdiction,"M there should not be doubt about the
threshold question of jurisdiction. The short answer may be that
the maze of analytical standards used by the courts has not, as has
been shown, produced consistent and predictable results in hard cases.
It is also important to recall the context in which the difficult ques-
tions of whether a case arises directly under federal law are decided.
There are no serious jurisdictional problems in the great bulk of civil
cases which arise under federal law-they represent routine, repetitive
litigation in which the jurisdictional issue has been settled by statute,
case law, or both." Only the novel claim of mixed federal and state
law presents the difficult question whether the case arises "directly"
under federal law. The extent of jurisdictional uncertainty is, as
it has been during most of the history of general federal question
jurisdiction, of small import in the day-to-day work of the district
courts.
More important, recognition of pragmatic factors and decisions
based on them will lead to predictable jurisdictional standards. Thus,
no matter how close the pragmatic judgment in a particular case, once
made it is bound to decide more than just the case before the court.
In other words, the process is not simply case-by-case decision making,
with each case standing on its own bottom, but rather a process of
clarifying jurisdictional uncertainty in classes of cases before the
court. It is, of course, true that a case may be so unique that a
jurisdictional decision has no impact on other cases. 74  Very often,
however, an authoritative decision of a novel problem of federal ques-
71 Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).72 E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). There are some
devices which may soften the impact of the rule, as the subsequent court of appeals
decision in this case shows. 207 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1953).
73 See note 65 supra.
74 See, e.g., Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (complex water
rights litigation) ; cf. In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah
1956).
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tion jurisdiction settles the issue for a class of cases. Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter" relegated a large group of miners' claims to
the state courts. Until the Declaratory Judgment Act, American Well
Works " placed suits by alleged patent infringers in the state courts.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.17 established a general juris-
dictional rule for constitutional challenges through the mechanism of
the stockholder's derivative suit. And so on.
Another case previously discussed illustrates the problem of
deciding how large the jurisdictional class should be. In Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 8 complex declaratory judgment liti-
gation turned upon the interpretation of the phrase "certificate of
public convenience and necessity" in a private contract. Among the
questions to be decided was whether that term incorporated the mean-
ing of the same term in the Natural Gas Act, and, if so, whether a
document obtained by one of the parties from the Federal Power
Commission was such a certificate. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
for the Court explained that a federal district court lacked federal
question jurisdiction on the basis of the "well-pleaded" rule. He
reasoned that the issue of federal law involved would have been
pleaded defensively in a traditional action for breach of contract, since
the issue arose in the context of interpreting a condition subsequent
giving the defendant power to terminate the contract. The Declaratory
Judgment Act was held not to operate to confer jurisdiction to decide
issues of federal law which would be pleaded defensively in a con-
ventional lawsuit.
Professor Mishkin has persuasively criticized the Court's analysis
in Skelly.79 Not only is it artificial and complex to judge the plead-
ings in a declaratory judgment action as if the plaintiff had brought
a common law coercive action, but doing so perpetuates the anomalies
and rigidities of the "well-pleaded" rule. Professor Mishkin sup-
ported the result in Skelly, and minimized Justice Frankfurter's fears
of a "vast current of litigation," by arguing that, pleading aside,
plaintiff's claim in Skelly did not arise "directly" under federal law.
The controversy did not arise "directly" because, in all cases where
a private contract chooses an event measured by federal law, it was
"state law under which the contract was made and would be enforced."
Professor Mishkin concluded that the case fell outside original federal
75 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
76241 U.S. 257 (1916).
77255 U.S. 180 (1921).
78 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
79 Mishkin 177-84.
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question jurisdiction, just as would a claim based on a wager as to
the next incumbent of a federal office.80
Professor Mishkin's analysis of the reason the claim in Skelly
did not arise "directly" under federal law seems to boil down to no
more than a sophisticated version of the proposition that it was state
law which created the cause of action. I would prefer a different
explanation. In cases like Skelly, arguably there is some need for an
expert federal forum in interpreting federal law, even though that
law has been incorporated in a private contract. But, obviously, that
need is counterbalanced. First, there is the real possibility that the
contract may be construed, once the merits of the controversy are
reached, to render the issue of federal law irrelevant or inconclusive;
there was in Skelly a real question whether the contract used the term
"certificate of public convenience and necessity" in the same sense
the Natural Gas Act used the term for entirely different purposes.8'
Second, in most cases where issues of federal law are relevant only
because incorporated in a private contract, there will be little federal
interest in providing the protective jurisdiction of a sympathetic
federal forum. And, finally, there would be real reason to fear a
"vast current of litigation" in the federal courts if parties could, in
effect, specify federal court jurisdiction by privately agreeing that
their disputes would be governed by federal law. There may be some
cases in which federal law is relevant only as incorporated in a private
contract, and in which there would be sufficient federal interest to
justify a conclusion favoring federal question jurisdiction. Arguably
Skelly itself might be such a caseY' But a general rule applied to all
cases in which federal law is incorporated in private contracts will work
well in most cases, and provide an administrable and predictable stand-
ard for that group of cases. For that reason, I agree with Professor
Mishkin that controversies as to the meaning of contractual terms
incorporating federal standards do not arise directly under federal
law. I disagree that the result can be explained entirely by inquiring
what law created the cause of action or under what law "the contract
was made and would be enforced."
As has been noted, the various irreconcilable formulae for
measuring federal jurisdiction have a tendency to survive. In part,
80 1d. at 183-84.
81 339 U.S. at 678-79.
82 The Federal Power Commission would be indifferent neither to judicial con-
struction of the scope of its order, nor to the question of whether its licensee had an
assured supply of gas. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the litigation
involved "determination of an important problem concerning a regulatory statute with
implications of public importance that private litigants naturally enough do not wholly
represent . . . ." For that reason, he suggested it might be appropriate for the trial
court to have the "benefit of the experience and illumination" of the Federal Power
Commission. Id. at 678.
THE BROKEN COMPASS
this is because the courts understandably and properly have sought
consistent results within groups of cases. Within limited groups of
cases, a particular formula may describe the results. The "law that
creates the cause of action" both describes and predicts results in cases
where, like Skelly, federal law simply measures the terms of a private
contract. It also works in some other classes of cases. A recurring
situation is the personal injury action where a federal law standard is
used to demonstrate that defendant's conduct amounted to wrongdoing.
The plaintiff sues for damages for negligently-inflicted personal in-
juries and claims that the defendant's conduct was wrongful because
it violated a federal statutory standard such as the Safety Appliance
Act or the Civil Aeronautics Act. In these cases, the issue of federal
question jurisdiction uniformly turns on the question whether federal
or state law creates the cause of action. The case does not arise under
federal law if federal law merely provides a standard of conduct which
affects a state-law-based negligence action. In Moore v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry.,s3 for example, plaintiff was a railroad employee engaged
in intrastate commerce who sought recovery under a state compensa-
tion law. That law, in turn, removed the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk if the accident was caused by
violation of any law, state or federal, enacted for the safety of em-
ployees. Plaintiff claimed his employer had violated provisions of the
Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Court held that the claim did
not arise under federal law since the right to recover damages "sprang
from the principle of the common law" 84 -even though interpretations
of the Safety Appliance Act in the state courts were federal questions
which could be reviewed by the Supreme CourtY5 By way of contrast,
however, if a federal law is construed to give a civil cause of action
for wrongful conduct in violation of federal law, the case does arise
under federal law."6 In personal injury cases then, the question of
whether the case arises under federal law is uniformly decided by
reference to the question whether federal law gives an express or
implied cause of action, or whether federal law merely sets a standard
of conduct for a state cause of action.
Formulas such as "the law that creates the cause of action" con-
tinue because they do have limited utility. At the same time, they
tend to obscure the pragmatic considerations which may govern de-
83291 U.S. 205 (1934).
84d. at 215.
8- Id. at 214.
86 Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
87 See, e.g., Moungey v.Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Moody v.
McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960); Mozingo v. Consolidated Constr. Co.,
171 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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cisions in the classes of cases for which the formulas are valid. In
the personal injury cases just described, turning the jurisdictional
issue on the question whether federal or state law gives the cause of
action can be explained pragmatically. Many federal judges have
been unhappy with the heavy load of personal injury cases swept into
federal courts as the largest single component of diversity juris-
diction. It is true that there is some need for an expert federal forum
to decide federal law issues in cases such as Moore v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry. This need, however, must be balanced against the significant
addition to the federal courts' caseload which would follow announce-
ment of a principle which admitted personal injury actions because the
defendant's wrongful conduct resulted, in part, from violation of one
of a growing number of federal laws regulating individual conduct."8
It was to be expected that, in view of this balance, federal judges
would not admit personal injury cases into the original jurisdiction
of the district courts, unless they contained something more than
federal law used to measure the wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct. Does the conclusion that federal law provides not only a
rule of conduct but also a federal cause of action supply that "some-
thing more"? It does in the sense that a decision that federal law
provides the cause of action represents a judgment by Congress, or by
the courts, of the necessity for a protective federal forum for civil
cases as well as a body of law regulating conduct. Moreover, once
it is decided that federal law provides the cause of action, there are
significant consequences beyond the decision that the case arises under
federal law. Other issues, such as the appropriate defenses and
measures of damages, become controlled by federal law. In cases
where the plaintiff elects to proceed in a state court, state procedural
law must yield when it is found to interfere unduly with enforcement
of the federal right.' In other words, the need for an expert and
sympathetic federal forum increases significantly with the decision
that federal law creates the cause of action."
That "the law that creates the cause of action" works well for
personal injury cases, does not mean that it should be viewed as a
talismanic test of federal question jurisdiction for all tort cases. The
recent case of Nationwide Charters & Conventions, Inc. v. Garber9
88 One example of federal safety standards which will be frequently involved in
private personal injury litigation are those set by the Secretary of Transportation
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. See Note, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 688, 692-94 (1967).
89 See, e.g., Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R., 353 U.S. 360 (1957).
90 And, of course, where the matter is in doubt, the need for a sympathetic
federal forum influences the decision that federal law creates the cause of action. See
generally Mishkin, The Varinsness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
91254 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mass. 1966).
[Vol.l15:890
THE BROKEN COMPASS
presents a good illustration. Northeast Airlines had brought suit in
federal court to enjoin plaintiff from engaging in unauthorized air
transportation in violation of the Federal Aviation Act. A final
decree enjoining Nationwide Charters had been issued, although, due
to two appeals, that judgment had not been settled at the time of this
suit. In the instant case, Nationwide Charters sued in a state court for
the tort of abuse of process in encouraging Northeast Airlines to bring
the earlier suit. After defendant removed to federal district court,
plaintiff moved to remand on the ground that the case did not arise
under federal law. Plaintiff argued that the claim for abuse of the
process of a federal court is a common law tort. In denying the motion,
the district court concluded that the claim was "governed by federal
law," although it was not necessary to "spell out what that law is." 92
That conclusion was, in turn, rested on the interest of federal courts
"not only in protecting their process but also in having such protection
administered uniformly," 9 3-a kind of reverse-twist "protective juris-
diction." In Nationwide Charters it made good sense to recognize
the existence of federal question jurisdiction to protect the successful
party in a federal action, or those allied with him, from unnecessary
harassment in the state courts. It ought not to have been necessary
to conclude that the cause of action for malicious prosecution is federal
in all respects to reach that result." But it is clear that the conclusion
that federal law "governed" the claim was based on those pragmatic
factors which ought to govern federal question jurisdiction. Frank
recognition of those factors in other cases would go far toward
rationalizing what has been a confusing issue.
The truth that finally emerges from Gully v. First National
Bank 11 is not that there are degrees by which federal law is "collateral,
peripheral or remote," subject to precise or scientific measurement. No
self-applying analytical standard will encompass the wide variety of
cases where judgment on the limits of federal question jurisdiction
is sought. As in the law of causation in torts, to which Justice
Cardozo made analogy, the final decisional process lies in the "common
sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations." 0
92Id. at 86.
03Id. at 87.
94 Compare the rule that a suit on a federal court judgment does not arise under
federal law. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). The practical import of
that rule, however, has been minimized by the provision for registration of federal
court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964).
95299 U.S. 109 (1936).
96299 U.S. at 117. Cardozo sought the answer to a causation question in an
analytical formula in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Judge Andrews protested that the problem could not be solved by any one considera-
tion. Id. at 353-54, 162 N.E. at 104. Dean Prosser concluded in 1953 that the cases
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Peripheral Applications of the Gully Standard
That there is no magic in the "jurisdictional philosophy" of the
Gully case also means that it has limited utility in solving problems
other than defining the scope of the statutory grant of federal question
jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, particularly, fell into the error
of seeing in the Gully case a skeleton key which would unlock many
dark federal jurisdiction closets. The most obvious mistake took
place in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety 17 where Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court attempted to use "the general
principle elucidated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in differentiating between
different stages of adjudication at which issues are reached . . ." "
to solve an issue concerning jurisdiction of a three-judge court. The
question was whether suits to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes
on the ground that they had been pre-empted by federal law could be
handled by a single district judge, or required a special three-judge
court. That question, in turn, was dependent upon whether an attack
on a state statute on the basis of pre-emption was a suit for injunction
"upon the ground of the unconstitutionality" of the state statute.99
Mr. Justice Frankfurter attempted to reconcile earlier, confusing, de-
cisions by having the issue of a three-judge court's jurisdiction in
pre-emption suits depend on whether the Constitution was "im-
mediately" or only "indirectly" brought into question. Kesler was
overruled three years later,100 largely because it turned the three-judge
court's jurisdiction on an issue that proved both "elusive" and
"unworkable." ' It also was overruled because the extent to
which preliminary questions of statutory interpretation were raised had
nothing to do with any of the reasons for invoking a three-judge
court.
10 2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills "o had a more ambitious assignment for "the juris-
dictional philosophy of Gully v. First National Bank." 104 The question
addressed by the Lincoln Mills dissent was the same as that in the
since Palsgraf demonstrate that "duty in negligence cases is a very involved and
complex problem, in which many factors interplay, and that the opinion of Cardozo
greatly over-simplified the whole matter." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICE. L.
REv. 1, 10 (1953).
97 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
981d. at 158. Justice Frankfurter had relied upon the Gully case, in passing,
in Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 253 (1941).
s928 U.S.C. §2281 (1964).
1o Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
101 Id. at 116, 124.
102 Id. at 128.
103353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957).
14 Id. at 481.
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Osborn case-the extent of Congress' power to create federal question
jurisdiction with only a minimum of substantive federal law content.
That question is beyond the scope of this article. The debate between
Justice Frankfurter's Lincoln Mills dissent and Professor Mishkin "o
comprehensively summarizes the arguments for a narrow or broad
conception of Congress' power to enlarge federal question jurisdiction.
It may be that Mr. Justice Frankfurter invoked the Gully case only
for the proposition that there is some possible middle ground between
Chief Justice Marshall's potential federal question test in Osborn and
Justice Johnson's insistence on an actual federal question.'0 6 It would
be difficult to justify any further reliance on Gully in plumbing the
limits of Congressional power to create federal question jurisdiction.
The cases which have construed the statutory grant of federal question
jurisdiction are of uncertain value when defining Congressional power
to extend the jurisdiction in particular cases. The pragmatic con-
siderations which should be considered in judging the constitutional
question are not the same as those which focus on construing the
general statutory grant of jurisdiction. The "jurisdictional philosophy
of Gully v. First National Bank" tells us no more than that a pragmatic
stopping place has to be located somewhere. Without more, that
philosophy does not teach us how to draw the line.
Summary
Before a case can be said to "arise" under federal law, two dis-
tinct criteria must be fulfilled. The first criterion is that the issue
of federal law be "well-pleaded" in the complaint. This is an
arbitrary and capricious standard, which often turns on pleading rules
which have lost all other significance under modern procedure. The
"well-pleaded" requirement will not yield to good, pragmatic reasons
for rejecting it in individual cases or groups of cases.0 7 That is
because its sole justification is to provide a rule of thumb permitting
the determination of jurisdiction on the face of the complaint. The
capricious results ordained by the "well-pleaded" rule might be changed
in several ways. At least in cases properly within the scope of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, it would have been possible to permit a
1
0 5 Mishkin 184-96.
'0 6 Mr. Justice Frankfurter cites the Gully case to criticize Marshall's premise
that every case in which a federal question might arise is capable of being commenced
in a federal court. 353 U.S. at 481.
107 On this point, Serio v. Liss, 300 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1961), is wrong.
The president of a local union sued for an injunction against his dismissal, and
a declaratory judgment that the Landrum-Griffin Act did not justify his dismissal.
The Court dispensed with the requirement that the federal issue be "well-pleaded"
in the complaint because of the kinds of policy factors here articulated. See Note,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 221, 224 (1962).
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potential defendant to raise a federal law issue in his declaratory
judgment complaint. As of now, that solution seems to be foreclosed
by Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.'o More comprehensive
reforms could involve, as suggested by the American Law Institute's
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts, enlarging the opportunity for removal on the basis of a
federal defense.' 9 Any such reforms, however, would increase the
need for study of the second criterion of federal question jurisdiction,
the requirement that a case arise directly under federal law. Unlike
the "well-pleaded" rule, this requirement is not a rule of thumb, but a
pragmatic limit upon federal question jurisdiction. Establishing the
contours of that limit requires inquiries and guesses about such
matters as these: the extent of the caseload increase for federal trial
courts if jurisdiction is recognized; the extent to which cases of this
class will, in practice, turn on issues of state or federal law; the extent
of the necessity for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of
federal law that do arise; the extent of the necessity for a sympathetic
federal tribunal in cases of this class. If the criteria of the "well-
pleaded" rule are eliminated or softened, much more thought will be
necessary concerning the considerations which determine when issues
of federal law make a case appropriate for initial federal trial.
108 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Professor Mishkin argues that Justice Frankfurter's
rationale in Skelly is dicta, because plaintiff's claim did not arise directly under federal
law. Mishkin 183-84.
109 ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICriOx BsrrvETEx STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1312 (Tent Draft No. 4, 1966).
